by Joseph Ball
Friday, 19 June 2009 19:05
Mizzima News
(Commentary) Grainy images of urban streets packed with predominantly young protesters filmed from a chaotic pedestrian overpass – the mass of people below surging forward together only to disperse in individual parts. Pictures and video issuing forth from civilian journalists in Tehran of reportedly hundreds of thousands marching in opposition to the country's recent electoral results all too easily aroused an indulgence in romantic reminiscences of mass protest amidst a sea of saffron.
Disaffection – especially among Iranian youth – to the prevailing government, the harsh crackdown on protesters conducted in the early stages by civilian pro-government militias and reliance on the part of the opposition on new means of media technology in disseminating news of the protests all contributed to a feeling of nostalgia for the heady days almost two years previously spewing forth from Shwedagon Pagoda and sweeping through the streets of Rangoon.
Yet, upon further reflection the streets of Tehran in June 2009 speak of far more differences than similarities in relation to Rangoon in September 2007, and the similarities that do exist remain largely uncommented upon in the face of the visual spectacle of mass demonstration and physical confrontation between protesters and security forces alike.
Protests in Iran, in support of the Presidential candidacy of Mir Hossein Mousavi, are far from revolutionary in nature. As opposed to concretely refuting a system of governance and the elite class – as the streets of Rangoon commonly came to symbolize – what is transpiring in Iran is an internal power struggle among the ruling class, albeit bolstered by rival civilian blocs.
Several Iranian opposition figures arrested to date held senior government positions under former reformist President Mohammad Khatami – whose largely failed agenda was indicative of the curtailed powers of the country's civilian Head-of-State as well as the muted reformist agenda itself. Among those detained are Mohammad Ali Abtahi, former Vice-President, Behzad Nabavi, a former Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mohsen Mirdamadi, who headed Parliament's foreign policy commission and former government spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh.
And while strong language has echoed forth from figures such as Grand Ayatollah Montazeri – who commented, "Our youth, hoping to see their rightful will fulfilled, came on the scene and waited patiently. This was the greatest occasion for the government’s officials to bond with their people," a sentiment with which Burmese opposition elements can certainly take heart – the language merely further cemented a long-standing ideological divide on Islamic governance between those who vied for the country's leadership following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini some two decades previously.
U.S. President Barack Obama himself curtly spelled out the situation earlier this week while speaking with CNBC: "Although there is amazing ferment taking place in Iran, the difference between Ahmedinejad and Mousavi in terms of their actual positions may not be as great as has been advertised."
If some form of compromise comes about as a result of the current unrest in Iranian urban centers, Burmese opposition elements would be wise to take notice of the highly visible presence of members of the established ruling class within the ranks of the protesters. And even if little tangible is seen to come of the protests, the degree of complexity for the government in confronting essentially an enemy within should not be lost.
Regarding American strategic approaches in dealing with Iran, though the Iranian government has accused the Obama administration of fueling the protests, to the degree that U.S. influence has contributed to the present instability in Iran, it is much more a dying reflection of the policies of the previous administration of George W. Bush – married with a long-standing Israeli security doctrine of external threat perception and deterrence.
Despite the rhetoric of Bush and the former First Lady in staunch, and sincere, support of the Burmese opposition, Iran – and specifically Tehran – today is emblematic of the significantly higher importance assessed by the U.S. to Iran as opposed to Burma.
In June 2008, it was revealed that a 2007 Bush administration directive provided for an additional 400 million dollars to expand U.S. operations in Iran, one priority of which was described as "supporting opposition groups in a bid to undermine the current regime."
As for Burma, the analogous level of financial support – generously estimated – stood at well less than five percent the amount allocated opposition elements within the Islamic Republic.
Concerning the Bush versus Obama administrations, Washington's priorities vis-à-vis Tehran have not markedly changed, however the strategic approaches to meeting American foreign policy objectives could potentially see a radical departure under the Obama administration as compared to his predecessor – precisely such a potential about-face in strategy which has sent shockwaves of urgency through some Burmese opposition camps.
How best to confront and deal with the growing possibility of a nuclear Iran? In its approach of targeting Iranian civilian opposition elements, the Bush administration hoped to auger in an era of democratically elected – or possibly better said, installed – politicians empowered and capable of reaching agreements with the international community concerning Iran's nuclear ambitions.
For Obama, the question now is whether to outwardly adopt the Bush approach, giving vocal support to the ambitions of the protesters on the streets of Iran, or to maintain pursuit of a policy of constructive engagement with the established decision making hierarchy – interpreting ultimate authority in directing Iran's nuclear capabilities as lying in the hands of Khamenei and the Guardian Council, an unelected body it appears not under any immediate threat from the current round of protests.
For Burmese, in witnessing the fallout of the 2009 Iranian election, what is important regarding American foreign policy is an appreciation for the significantly reduced American national interest associated with Burma as opposed to Iran. And, it should be added, an apparent inclination on the part of Obama to approach foreign policy objectives from a much more realist platform than the ideological dais occupied by his predecessor.
In addition to critical differences between Iran and Burma, and the interests and approaches of the United States concerning the two countries, there are also similarities warranting comment. One such observable tapering of history concerning Iran 2009 and Burma 2007 is the starkly defined deviation between urban and rural populations.
A vastly disproportionate amount of attention given post-election Iran has dealt with urban protests to the announced electoral result – populations which both primary camps admitted throughout campaigning were hotly contested battlegrounds. However, with Ahmedinejad regarded as widely popular among rural areas, which comprise a third of the Iranian state (the corresponding ratio for Burma is two-thirds), assumption that the streets of Tehran and other urban focal points are representative of a final vote tally in favor of Mousavi are highly speculative, even if there did exist instances of voting fraud.
Obama himself came dangerously close to falling into the trap of equating sentiments predominantly relayed via media savvy urban centers as automatically representative of a general national consensus when he aired his hope that the final outcome from the election would affirm "the universal principles of peaceful expression and democracy."
Politics, especially as seen relating to a developing or third world country through the lens of the dominant international media often focuses on urban voices – an approach arguably not altogether conducive to covering protests in Tehran and Rangoon. Additionally, the potential political disenfranchisement of rural populations in the developing and third worlds is in turn only heightened with the infusion of further media technologies grossly over-representative of a young urban class.
Analysts have already remarked on the necessity of Iran's rural population to rise up if the present round of protests is to realize any significant change. A somewhat similar lesson can also be learned from the aftermath of Burma's Saffron Revolution.
All this is not to say that Burma's rural population should be estimated to support the military government or oppose any potential candidacy of Aung San Suu Kyi, but it would also be unwise to believe that the interests and priorities of the rural population are synonymous with those expressed in the country's urban centers and technological "hot spots". Change, yes…but what kind of change, to what end and speaking to what priorities?
What, then, can ultimately be taken from the streets of Tehran and applied to strategic formulations focusing on a future Burmese state?
First, the incorporation of existing elites into the opposition power structure carries disproportionate strength and potential for power projection. Second, an Obama administration is far from eager, perhaps even already decisively unwilling, to mimeograph a Bush approach to diplomacy or the meeting of foreign policy objectives. Lastly, lines of communication need not only be strengthened between Rangoon and other international portals, but even more significantly between Burma's urban population and the country's vast rural hinterland.
A refusal to incorporate these lessons and others into the strategic framework of Burma crisis management and conflict transformation will likely only ensure more of the same for Burma's struggling populace.
Friday, June 19, 2009
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